Ï㽶ÊÓƵ

ɱ¹Ã©²Ô±ð³¾±ð²Ô³Ù

Atelier de théorie du droit: Wrongs, wrongfulness, and culpability in indirect discrimination law

Mercredi, 2 novembre, 2016 16:00à17:30
Chancellor Day Hall Stephen Scott Seminar Room (OCDH 16), 3644 rue Peel, Montreal, QC, H3A 1W9, CA

Atelier de théorie du droit avec notre invité , professeur agrégé de droit à Oxford. Ses intérêts de recherche comprennent le droit public, le droit de la discrimination et la théorie du droit. Il a récemment publié une monographie intitulée 'A Theory of Discrimination Law' (OUP). He parlera d'un article qu'il prépare sur les torts, l'illicéité et la culpabilité dans le droit de la discrimination indirecte.

¸éé²õ³Ü³¾Ã©

(En anglais seulement) In this paper, we examine the nature of the duty-imposing norms in indirect discrimination (ID) law. We aim to clarify two main issues. First, we determine the extent to which these norms should be understood as imposing particular duties – duties owed to particular individuals or as imposing general duties – duties owed to no one in particular – or, perhaps, both. Let’s call this the duty inquiry. Second, we clarify the extent to which considerations of culpability should be considered to be aspects of the wrong(s) of discrimination. Let’s call this the culpability inquiry. This paper is motivated by a recent trend in British and American law to doubt the legitimacy of the prohibition on ID and to attempt to curtail its operation. We show through these inquiries that the prohibition on ID is legitimate. To do so, we carve a nuanced conceptual location for ID, as necessitated in part by corrective justice and in part by distributive justice.

The first part of the paper provides a general explanation of the concepts of particular and general duties. The second and third parts undertake the duty inquiry and culpability inquiry respectively. We find that prima facie indirect discrimination usually entails the breach of two distinct duties, making it wrong and wrongful. We also claim that while indirectly discriminatory acts can be wrongful though not otherwise culpable, culpability considerations are nonetheless relevant to supporting the liability regime for indirect discrimination. The fourth part offers observations on the structure of discrimination law in light of our analysis.

Pour davantage d'informations, contactez le professeur paul.miller [at] mcgill.ca (Paul Miller).

Back to top